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PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS
Jennifer Frankel
Abstract: Seattle's transfer of development rights (TDR) system, an innovative land use
device, has so far avoided many of the problems that have plagued other TDR systems.
Although the system's voluntary participation avoids a takings challenge, it is still vulnerable
to attack on due process grounds. In addition, two U.S. Supreme Court cases held that
conditions in land use regulations must closely mirror the harms sought to be prevented,
suggesting new constitutional problems for Seattle's TDR system. This Comment describes
Seattle's current TDR system and examines its vulnerability to constitutional challenges. This
paper concludes that while Seattle's TDR system will probably avoid the pitfalls of past TDR
systems, proposed changes would increase its vulnerability to due process challenges.

The past thirty years have witnessed a trend in land use planning
toward local systems that compensate owners of low-income housing
and historic landmarks in exchange for a promise to forgo further
development of their land.! Transferable Development Rights (TDR)
systems allow landowners to transfer a parcel's unused development
potential to other sites either by moving the rights to the landowner's
other properties or by selling the rights to other developers. The
landowner of the site receiving the development rights can then build to a
greater height and density than otherwise allowed by local zoning
regulations.2 By providing monetary incentive to landowners to retain
low-income housing and historic landmark theaters, an innovative TDR
system in Seattle, Washington, has already been successful in saving
several of these structures.3
Past legal challenges to TDR systems focused on whether the
regulation that provides TDR in exchange for a restriction creates either
a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or a
violation of due process.4 Seattle's TDR system sidesteps the takings
challenge by making landowner participation in the program voluntary.5
Landowners who prefer to tear down their low-income housing are free
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
See infra Part LB.2.
See infra notesl06-16 and accompanying text.
See infra note 160 and accompanying text
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to do so.6 Many landowners, however, choose to sell their rights because
of their high value. High demand and a strong market for development
rights are essential to ensure the success of a voluntary TDR system.7
Past experience indicates that owners of low-density, low-incomeproducing buildings will not choose to limit their ability to develop their
land without significant compensation
Although Seattle's program will probably avoid a successful takings
challenge, it is vulnerable to a due process challenge under two separate
theories. First, the system may violate due process by jeopardizing
citizens' health and safety. Municipalities establish zoning limits to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. Theoretically,
transferring development rights that allow developers to build beyond the
zoning limit compromises citizens' health, safety, and welfare; therefore
a program authorizing such transfers may be vulnerable to a due process
challenge.' The second due process theory rests on the assumption that
the zoning limits have been set too low and buildings in excess of the
zoning limitations will not jeopardize citizens' health, safety, or welfare.
Developers could make a due process argument that they should not be
required to purchase development rights to build higher and at greater
density.'0
Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission" and Dolan v. City of Tigard,2 pose another constitutional
challenge to Seattle's TDR system. In both decisions, the Court held that
a regulatory restriction on development must have a close connection to
the harm it proposes to prevent. 3 TDR systems allow developers to pay
to save low-income housing (the condition) in exchange for the right to
build larger buildings (the harm). Developers who buy rights to build at
greater densities might argue that the harm of larger buildings is not
connected to the condition of low-income housing. To pass this
6. See City of Seattle Dep't of Community Dev. & Downtown Hous. Advisory Task Force,
Transfer Development Rights: TDR Bank Report C6 (1988) [hereinafter TDR Bank Report]
(discussing survey indicating that landowners are not necessarily interested in participating in TDR
program).
7. See id.
8. See John J. Costonis, SpaceAdrift: Landmark Preservationand the Marketplace 6, 9 (1974).
9. See infra notes 169, 171, and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
13. See infra notes 206-210, 218-224, and accompanying text.
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constitutional test, Seattle would have to show that the preservation of
low-income housing and historic landmark theaters alleviates the harm of
larger, denser downtown buildings.
Part I of this Comment examines the property law basis for TDR
systems. It also explores past TDR systems in New York, a proposed
system for Chicago, and the sophisticated TDR system used by Seattle.
Part II reviews past constitutional challenges to TDR systems including
takings, due process attacks, and possible future challenges based on
Nollan and Dolan. Finally, it discusses Seattle's vulnerability to these
past and future constitutional challenges and concludes that although
Seattle's current TDR system may avoid the pitfalls of past TDR
systems, proposed changes will make it vulnerable to a due process
challenge.
I.

TDR SYSTEMS

A.

Structure of TDR Systems

TDR systems originated as a mechanism to save historic landmarks
while sidestepping Fifth Amendment takings challenges by providing
value to the restricted landowner.14 In addition to landmarks, current
systems allow owners of redeveloped land,"s low-income housing
developments,16 or rural land forming part of a preservation program to
transfer development rights. 7 TDR systems provide compensation for
landowners whose land is restricted. 8 A basic TDR system works by
allowing landowners to sell excess development rights attached to their
land (the sending site) to landowners who want to develop their land (the
receiving site) beyond the current zoning limits.' 9 The amount of
development rights is generally calculated in square footage of floor

14. See Roger A. Cunningham et al, The Law ofProperty 644 (2d ed. 1993).
15. See Sarah J. Stevenson, Note, Banking on TDRs: The Government's Role as Banker of
TransferableDevelopmentRights, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1329, 1345-47 (1998).
16. See TDR BankReport, supranote 6, at 2.
17. See Kery Murakami, Next Stepfor Growth, Denny Triangle?,Seattle Times, Dec. 23, 1998, at
Al.
18. See Cunningham, supra note 14, at 644-45 (quoting D. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 11.26
(1982)).
19. See Terry Jill Lassar, Carrots& Sticks: New Zoning Downtown 185 (1989).
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area.2" The option to sell excess development rights can offer landowners
a strong monetary incentive to restrict development on their land.21
TDR systems are based on the notion that an excess of development
potential exists because the present use of the sending site does not fully
exploit the usable area available under the current zoning limits. 22 TDR
systems are valuable land use tools because they allow the transfer of a
plot's development potential to land where greater density will not be
objectionable.' Contrary to the traditional view that development rights
are inextricably tied to a specific plot of land, TDR systems suggest that
development rights in land are separable from other ownership rights.24
The property metaphor most often used to describe the TDR concept is
that of a bundle of sticks where each individual property right is
separable from the others.' TDR systems separate the right to possess
land from the right to develop land and assert that those development
rights are transferable to other plots of land.26 Once the development
rights are severed from the sending site and sold, the owner of the site
must commit to restricting more intense development on the site.27
Architects of early TDR systems that allowed only direct transfers
from the sending site to the receiving site found this process ineffective
when one landowner had development rights to sell, but could find no

20. See id.
21. The price of development rights rises as the demand rises. In 1997, rights sold for $11 per
square foot while in 1999 the going price is $13. See Clair Enlow, Developers Startingto Put a Price
on Development Rights, Seattle Daily J. Com., July 1, 1998, at 1.
22. See John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 574, 576 (1972). One commentator suggests that "(t]he rationale
behind TDR plans embodies the notion that the property upon which development is restricted (the
transferor property) does not completely fill its allotted zoning envelope, and therefore has unused
development rights which should be transferable to other parcels of land (the transferee property)."
Michael D. Strugar, TransferableDevelopment Rights: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?, 62 U. Det. L.
Rev. 633, 633 (1985).
23. See John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 Yale L.J. 75,
85-86 (1973).
24. See John J. Delaney et al., TDR Redux: A Second GenerationofPracticalLegal Concerns, 15
Urb. Law. 593, 595 (1983).
25. See Edward H. Ziegler, The Transfer of Development Rights (Part1), 18 Zoning & Plan. L.
Rep. 61 (1995).
26. See Franklin J. James & Dennis E. Gale, Zoningfor Sale: A CriticalAnalysis of Transferable
Development Rights Programs2-3 (1977).
27. See Norman Marcus, TransferableDevelopment Rights: A CurrentAppraisal, Prob. & Prop.,
Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 40, 41. These commitments run with the land as real covenants. See id.
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developer interested in purchasing them.2 8 One early proponent of TDR
systems suggested the creation of a TDR bank that would be
administered by the city, with the city having the authority to purchase
and hold development rights when there was no ready buyer. 9 TDR
banks have proven very effective in bridging the time gap between when
landowners wish to sell their development rights and when developers
want to buy them. The TDR bank provides a ready market for
development rights when the local real estate market cannot."
B.

Evolution of TDR Systems

TDR systems preserved or made possible New York's Grand Central
Station 1 and South Street Seaport,3 2 the New Jersey Pinelands, 3

Seattle's downtown low-income housing,3' and Seattle's Benaroya
Symphony HIall.35 TDR systems were a favorite topic of legal writers in
the 1970s and early 1980s. 36 Articles about TDR systems focused
primarily on the theoretical models because few actual systems existed at
that time.37 Although initially hesitant, 38 land use planners have embraced

28. See TDR Bank Report,supra note 6, at 1.
29. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
30. During an economic downturn, Seattle's TDR bank managed to save over 300 units of lowincome housing by purchasing the development rights and banking them. See Enlow, supra note 21.
31. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
32. See Stevenson, supra note 15, at 1345-47.
33. See U at 1347-50.
34. See TDR BankReport,supranote 6, at Introduction.
35. See Enlow, supranote 21.
36. See Costonis, supranote 8; David Berry & Gene Steiker, An EconomicAnalysis of Transferof
Development Rights, 17 Nat. Resources J. 55 (1977) (discussing economic aspects of TDR);
Costonis, supra note 22 (describing his TDR plan to preserve landmarks in Chicago); Costonis,
supra note 23 (establishing legal arguments for TDR); Delaney, supra note 24 (examining second
generation of TDR programs); James H. Foster, The Transferability ofDevelopment Rights, 53 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 165 (1981) (discussing nontransferability of development rights); Norman Marcus, Air
Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Mergerand the Well-ConsideredPlan,50 Brook. L. Rev.
867 (1984) (covering history of TDR in New York City); Dwight H. Merriam, Making TDR Work,
56 N.C. L. Rev. 77 (1978) (suggesting models for successful TDR programs); Strugar, supra note 22
(discussing zoning problems TDR create); Comment, Development Rights Transfer in New York
City, 82 Yale L.J. 338 (1972) (discussing history of New York City's TDR plan); Note, The
Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 Yale L.J. 1101 (1975) (discussing
unconstitutionality of TDR).
37. See infra Part I.B.1.
38. See Marcus, supra note 27, at 42.
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TDR systems throughout the United States over the last decade." Current
TDR systems have evolved from simple plans to move density between
adjacent lots to complex systems containing TDR banks that buy and sell
development rights and transfer them throughout an entire city.4 New
York City's early TDR system and a plan to save Chicago's historic
4
landmarks provided the framework for Seattle's complex TDR bank. '
1.

The New York City and Chicago Plans

-Standing in the forefront of land use law, New York City passed the
United States' first zoning ordinance in 1916.42 Later, in keeping with its
tradition of innovative land use law, New York responded to the problem
of historic landmark preservation with the creation of a TDR program.43
In 1961, New York enacted the Zoning Resolution that was a precursor
to its TDR system." By redefining "zoning lot" to allow density transfers
between contiguous lots that had the same landowner, the 1961
Resolution relaxed the tight zoning controls of the 1916 Resolution.4 5
Although ultimately ineffective in saving landmarks, the architects of
a 1968 amendment to New York's zoning law 46 attempted to make
development rights more valuable by allowing landmark owners to sell
their development rights to different owners of adjacent lots.47 The 1968
amendment defined an "adjacent lot" as land either contiguous or across
the street from the landmark site or one of a series of lots of a common
owner that connected to the landmark site.4 8 The main reason for the
1968 amendment's ineffectiveness in saving historic landmarks was the
39. There were over 30 municipalities identified a decade ago with TDR programs. See Madelyn
Glickfield, Update on Transfer of Development Rights, 1375, 1378 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Conference
Material, Aug. 14-18, 1989) (suggesting that survey does not fully reflect actual number of
programs).
40. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
41. See infra Part I.B.2.
42 See Historical Setting, in Zoning and the American Dream 1 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S.
Kayden eds., 1989).
43. See Jerome G. Rose, A Proposalfor the Separationand Marketability ofDevelopment Rights
as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, in TransferofDevelopment Rights 84 (Jerome G. Rose ed.,
1975).
44. See Merriam, supra note 36, at 90.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Costonis, supra note 22, at 585.
48. See id.
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lack of incentive for landmark owners to sell their development rights.49
Because the plan allowed only transfers to adjacent lots, landmark
owners would participate in the program only if their landmarks
happened to be adjacent to lots that needed development rights." In
addition, because the New York plan was voluntary,"' the city could not
save the landmark if the 5landowner
chose not to participate in the
2
development rights transfer.
A proposed, but never implemented, TDR system for Chicago sought
to solve the problems inherent in the New York plan. In 1972, John C.
Costonis, a professor of urban planning law at the University of Illinois,
Urbana, waged an unsuccessful battle to save Chicago's Old Stock
Exchange building from destruction to make way for a forty-five story
office building. 3 Out of its rubble, Costonis developed what is now
known as the Chicago plan.' Costonis acknowledged that landmarks in
historic areas outside of downtown and other high-land-value areas could
often be saved by traditional landmark preservation designation. 5
However, he realized that landmarks located within the high-land-value
downtown core would remain extremely vulnerable to destruction;
speculators would put resources into litigation against the city for the
purpose of developing unproductive historic sites and maximizing the
return on their investment5 6
Costonis identified and corrected a number of weaknesses in the New
York plan.5 ' To create incentives for landowners to transfer their rights,
Costonis envisioned the creation of a "development rights transfer
district" within which landowners could transfer unused development
rights regardless of adjacency." Costonis believed that a TDR system
that facilitated transfer between districts would be the next step in the
definition of the zoning unit. 9 Even though the Chicago plan sought to

49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 586.
See id. at 586-87.
See i at 588.
See id.

53. See Costonis, supra note 8, at xv.

54. See id. at xvi.
55. See Costonis, supranote 22, at 582.

56. See id.at 582.
57. See id at 586-89.
58. See Costonis, supra note 23, at 86.
59. See Costonis, supra note 22, at 622.
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eliminate the adjacency requirement, it only redistributed alreadyauthorized bulk within the district, as opposed to creating more density. 6'
Costonis claimed that shifting development rights from one lot to another
would not affect the overall density of the downtown area.6 '
Costonis saw the voluntary aspect of the New York plan as another
impediment to its success.62 Costonis suggested solving this problem
through the use of a development rights bank.63 Start-up money for the
bank would come from the sale of development rights of publicly owned
landmarks.' If a landowner refused to participate in the program,
Costonis suggested that the municipality step in and use its power of
eminent domain to take the property.65 The landowner's compensation
would come from funds in the development rights bank,66 and the
development rights severed from his or her land would be placed in the
bank.67 Costonis envisioned the Chicago plan saving historic landmarks
as well as allowing municipalities to establish their own urban planning
goals separate from the whims of the private marketplace.6 8
2.

Seattle's TDR Bank

Costonis was never able to persuade Chicago to adopt his plan,69 but
other cities have implemented some of his ideas.70 Although different
both in purpose and effect7' from Costonis's plan, the TDR bank in
Seattle still uses much of his structure.72 Seattle already had a TDR
system before it developed its TDR bank, but the slowdown in

60. See Costonis, supra note 23, at 88.
61. The assumption is that because density is only shifted and produces no net gain in a city's
density, it is somehow less worrisome than if more density has been added. See Costonis, supra note
8, at 33-34. Individuals who work in the downtown areas with the highest densities might not agree.
62. See Costonis, supra note 8, at 56.
63. See Costonis, supra note 23, at 87.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id.
See Costonis, supra note 22, at 590.
See id.
See Costonis, supranote 23, at 87.

68. See Costonis, supranote 8, at xvi.
69. See Merriam, supra note 36, at 98.
70. See, e.g., Lassar,supra note 19, at 83 (describing San Francisco's use of TDR).
71. Seattle was more interested in using the bank to bridge the timing gap as opposed to using it
to purchase development rights from reluctant landowners. See TDR Bank Report,supra note 6, at 1.
72. See id.
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downtown development, curtailing demand for development rights, hampered its success.73

Seattle initially established its TDR system to preserve low-income
housing.74 Throughout the 1980s, Seattle implemented several innovative
programs to save low-income housing, but the courts invalidated most of
them as violating substantive due process.'5 In 1988, Seattle's Depart-

ment of Community Development, in connection with a Downtown
Housing Advisory Task Force, suggested expanding the existing TDR

system by implementing a TDR bank that would purchase development
rights when the private market could not absorb them.76 By purchasing
the rights, the TDR bank proved an effective means of preserving lowincome housing, historic landmarks, and performing arts centers during

the late 1980s and early 1990s when developers were not interested in
purchasing development rights." Since its inception in 1988,78 the city's
TDR bank has helped to save 337 low-income housing units and 2
landmark theaters, and helped finance Benaroya Hall, the city's new
symphony hail.79
The Seattle system allows landowners to receive immediate monetary
compensation by selling rights either directly to an individual or to the
TDR bank. ° The TDR bank was created to improve the TDR market and
increase the incentive for landowners to participate.8 ' Seattle uses the
TDR bank to persuade private landowners to sell their rights, thereby
protecting low-income housing. 2 The TDR bank also provides a funding
73. See id. The city identified the problem with the program as being the "timing gap" between
when low-income housing owners want to sell their rights and when commercial developers want to
buy them. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993) (holding law requiring mobile
park owners to help with relocation costs of tenants as violation of substantive due process); R/L
Assocs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402, 780 P.2d 838 (1989) (invalidating Seattle
ordinance that made owners of low-income housing provide tenants with relocation expenses prior
to converting property to nonresidential use); San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d
20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987) (invalidating Seattle ordinance that restricted owners of low-income
housing from converting property to nonresidential use).
76. See TDR BankReport, supranote 6, at 1.
77. See Enlow, supra note 21.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See TDR Bank Report, supranote 6, at Introduction.
See Enlow, supranote 21.
See id.
See TDR Bank Report, supranote 6, at C2.
See id.at C8-C9.
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mechanism for the city itself to buy housing and then sell the
development rights. 3
Because Seattle's program is voluntary, a high demand for
development rights must exist for the program to succeed. Since the late
1990s, the strong market for development rights has ensured that the
demand for development rights exceeds the supply.' In 1988, the
architects of the plan envisioned developers demanding 50,000 square
feet per year of development rights to increase the size of their
buildings.8 5 In 1998, Seattle estimated that developers sought 636,000
square feet of development rights for projects. 6
The large demand for development rights in Seattle can be attributed
to the passage of an initiative to cu1b growth in downtown Seattle. 7 In
May 1989, Seattle voters passed the Citizen's Alternative Plan (CAP) in
response to several years of intensive building of both private and public
projects. 8 Heavy construction from this intensive development turned
downtown into what some Seattle residents called "Little Beirut."8 9 In
response, the CAP limited the available new office space in the
downtown area to 500,000 square feet a year for the years 1989-1994,
and then 1,000,000 square feet a year for the following five years.' The
CAP changed existing downtown zoning by lowering the Floor-to-Area
Ratio (FAR)9 density limit and capping the height of new buildings at
450 feet (about forty stories).9 2 Because the FAR is extremely low under
the CAP,93 developers of most new office buildings need to purchase
development rights or incorporate some other type of zoning bonus to

83. Interview with Jane Voget, Seattle Dep't of Housing Servs., in Seattle, Wash. (Nov. 5, 1998).
84. See Enlow, supranote 21.
85. See TDR Bank Report,supra note 6, at 15.
86. See Enlow, supra note 21.
87. Interview with Jane Voget, supra note 83 (discussing effect of Citizen's Alternative Plan
(CAP) on development rights).
88. See Lassar,supra note 19, at 24.
89. Together the construction of the Westlake Center, the convention center, and the bus tunnel
snarled downtown traffic for years. See id.
at 23.
90. See id at 24.
91. City planners use FAR to limit the density of buildings. FAR represents the ratio between the
total amount of floor area and the size of the building lot. See id. at 9.
92. See id. at 24.
93. The CAP initiative lowered the FAR from 10 to 5 in the densest part of downtown Seattle,
and to build above a FAR of 7 (an amount that can be reached through other zoning bonuses),
developers must purchase development rights. See id. at 24-25.
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build at desired densities.' Although the limit on the total amount of
square footage ends in 1999, the low FAR does not.95 This squeeze
between the density limit of the CAP and the rising downtown real estate
market heightens the demand for development rights.9 6 Although not part
of its original goal, the CAP ensures that developers will purchase
development rights to build.
As of 1998, Seattle's TDR program allows owners of eligible lowincome housing and Landmark Performing Arts Theaters (LPAT) to sell
between five and eight FAR of unused development rights to private
landowners or to the city's TDR bank.' To be eligible to sell their excess
rights, owners of low-income housing must agree to maintain the
building in its present state for twenty years.98 For an LPAT site to be
eligible, the city must designate it as a landmark and provide a
Certificate of Approval for its rehabilitation."
The success of Seattle's TDR program has generated suggestions for
new types of eligible sending sites. In early 1999, a community group
consisting of residents and developers of downtown Seattle submitted
suggestions for new ways of generating development rights.'0 0 The
suggestions included a "Landmark Building Inefficiency TDR" which
would compensate owners of such buildings for the heightened expense
of operating them,' and an Open Space TDR that would grant
landowners the ability to sell development rights generated from open
spaces. 2 The interest in new types of eligible sending sites stems from
the success of the program and the high price the rights bring in the
Seattle market. 3

94. See id. at 25. The low FAR that the CAP established guarantees a demand for development
rights. Even buildings far below the height of 40 stories need to purchase development rights
because of the artificially low FAR. For example, both the 38-story Madison Financial Center and a
19-story office building at the comer of Second and Columbia requested the purchase of
development rights from the city's bank. See Enlow, supra note 21.
95. See Lassar,supranote 19, at 24.
96. Interview with Jane Voget, supra note 83.
97. See City of Seattle, Dep't of Constr. & Land Use, Director'sRule 20-93, at 92, 100.
98. See Udat91.
99. See id at 99.
100. See Downtown Urban Ctr.Planning Group, DRAFTApproval and.4doptionMatrix (1999).
101. See id at 9.
102. See id at 8-9.
103. Interview with Jane Voget, supra note 83.
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO TDR SYSTEMS

A.

TraditionalChallenges

1.

Takings andDue Process

TDR systems developed out of a tension between land use regulation
and landowner rights."° The power of eminent domain gives federal,
state, and local governments the ability to take private property for public
use without the owner's consent. 5 The Fifth Amendment protects
against abuses of this power by providing that the land not be taken
"without just compensation."'0 6 The Supreme Court has held that a land
use regulation can be a taking. 10 7 The two-prong test for a regulatory
taking includes an inquiry into whether the ordinance substantially
advances a legitimate state interest, and whether the ordinance denies all
economically viable use of the land.'0 8 A city exposes itself to a
regulatory taking claim if the method chosen to preserve historic
landmarks results in no economic or beneficial use remaining in the
land-in essence a condemnation. 9 Because limiting a building's use
would rarely render it completely valueless, landowners who have
challenged historic preservation programs as takings have been
unsuccessful." 0
In addition to bringing takings challenges, developers can challenge
land use regulations on substantive due process grounds."' The
government's ability to enact land use regulations lies in the Tenth
Amendment, which allows local governments to use police powers to
promote "public health, safety, or the general welfare." 1 2 Although the
standard is broad and vague, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a
limitation on governmental Tenth Amendment powers. As Justice

104.
105.
106.
107.

See James & Gale, supranote 26, at 2.
See Cunningham, supra note 14, at 506.
U.S. Const. Amend. V.
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
108. See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 231, 238-39 (1988).
109. See Costonis, supra note 8, at 12-14.
110. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 105 (1978) (holding
historic designation of New York City's Grand Central Station not taking).
111. See Cunningham, supranote 14, at 513.
112. Id. at 512-13.
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Brennan asserted in a footnote in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego,"' a regulation that "is not enacted in furtherance of the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare" might constitute a due
process violation." 4 Although due process challenges and takings
challenges are theoretically unconnected, Justice Brennan's assertion
sounds suspiciously similar to the first prong in the regulatory takings
analysis.'15 The reality is that courts often do not distinguish between
takings and due process arguments, and confusion exists between the two
constitutional challenges." 6 TDR systems, like other land use regulatory
schemes, have been challenged under both theories. 17
2.

Decisions Question the Constitutionalityof TDR Systems

Judicial opinions and commentary on TDR systems have focused on
the restrictions placed on the sending site and how the system can be
used to avoid a regulatory taking or a violation of due process."'
However, what role development rights will play in a takings/just
compensation analysis remains an unanswered question." 9 Despite
extensive commentary on TDR systems, 20 only three main cases speak
to their constitutionality: FredF. French Investment Co. v. City of New
York, 121 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City," and
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency." Although the courts in
these cases did not reach the issue of whether development rights provide
just compensation, these opinions do provide a helpful framework for
assessing whether TDR systems might avoid a constitutional
challenge. 24
113. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
114. Id. at 657 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. See supranote 108 and accompanying text.
116. See Cunningham, supra note 14, at 513.
117. See infra Part ILA.2.
118. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d
381 (N.Y. 1976); supranote 36 for commentary.
119. See Strugar, supra note 22, at 638.
120. See supra note 36.
121. 350 N.E.2d 381.
122. 438 U.S. 104.
123. 520 U.s. 725.
124. See, e.g., FredF. French,350 N.E.2d at 388-89 (discussing use of Chicago Plan to ensure
just compensation).
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In Fred F. French, the Planning Commission of New York City
rezoned two parcels zoned for apartments as a Special Park District in
response to the owner's intent to erect buildings on them."2 The rezoning
allowed the owner to transfer some of the parcel's development rights to
unspecified receiving lots elsewhere in the city.1 26 The landowner sued,
claiming that the rezoning was a compensable taking within the meaning
of constitutional limitations.' 27 The New York Court of Appeals
recognized the potential of development rights, 12' but did not believe that
they provided value until they "could be attached to some accommodating real property.' ' 29 The court held that the development rights had no
value because of the lack of a market for them in New York. 30 Although
the court found the change in zoning a violation of due process, in dicta
it proposed a TDR structure similar to the Chicago plan that would pass
constitutional scrutiny.'13 The zoning scheme in Fred F. French could
not pass constitutional muster because the landowner was forced to
shoulder the economic burden of a public amenity-a clear violation of
32
due process.
In 1978, the Supreme Court faced the TDR issue in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York. 33 Penn Central, the owner of the Grand
Central Terminal, proposed to erect an office building above the
terminal.' 34 Because the terminal had a landmark designation, 135 the
developers had to submit their plans to the Landmarks Preservation
Commission, which rejected the proposed development. 36 The landmark
designation brought with it the right to transfer the terminal's
development rights to other land owned by Penn Central located near the

125.
126.
127.
128.

See
See
See
See

id. at 383-84.
id at384.
id.
id at 387.

129. Id at 388.
130. See id at 389.
131. See id at 388. The court specifically suggested a TDR bank system that would immediately
compensate landowners with money, as opposed to "development rights [that are] disembodied
abstractions of man's ingenuity," and only achieve value when "attached to some accommodating
real property." Id.

132. See Merriam, supranote 36, at 94.
133. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
134. See id. at 116.
135. See id at 115-16.
136. See id. at 117.
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terminal.' 37 Penn Central sued, claiming that its land had been taken
without just compensation."3 The Supreme Court identified two issues in
the case: (1) does the regulation constitute a taking, and if so, (2) do the
development rights provide just compensation. 39 Because the Court held
that there was no taking,"4 it never answered the question of whether
development rights constitute just compensation when there are specific
receiving sites for the development rights.141 The Court stated that
although the owner could not use the air rights of the terminal to build
above it, those rights could be transferred to other parcels and therefore
had value. 42 If there had been a taking, it was unclear whether the
development rights would have provided "just compensation."' 43 The
Court implied that the development rights can be considered at the ad
hoc, factual balancing stage to determine if a taking has occurred under
the Fifth Amendment, but once there has been a taking, the development
rights might not be valuable enough to provide just compensation.'"
In 1997, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to better define the
role of development rights in the takings/just compensation equation in
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 45 but because the issue was
not squarely before the Court, the majority opinion declined to do so."4
The plaintiff, Bernadine Suitum, bought property near Lake Tahoe in
1972."47 In 1987, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) rezoned
areas around Lake Tahoe to create Stream Environment Zones (SEZs)
137. See ia.at 114. The lots that were allowed to take the development rights had been expanded
immediately before the landmark commission designated the Terminal specifically to not "unduly
restrict the development options of the owners of Grand Central Terminal." Id.
138. See id at 119.

139. See idat 122.
140. See id.
at 138.

141. See idat 122. The court noted that the landowners owned at least eight buildings that could
receive the development rights. See id.

142. See idat 137.
143. Id
144. See id at 137.
145. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).

146. The majority noted:
While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDR's [sic] both to the claim that
a taking has occurred and to the constitutional requirement ofjust compensation, we have no
occasion to decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these TDR's [sic] may be considered
in deciding the issue of whether there has been ataking in this case ....

Id. at 728.
147. See idat 730.
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within which no development could occur. 48 To mitigate the harshness
of the new zoning, the TRPA granted property owners a variety of
development rights (the value of which was unclear) that could be sold to
other landowners whose land did not fall within a SEZ. 14 9 Suitum's
property fell within a SEZ, and she sued both on a violation of due
process theory and a takings claim.' 50 The TRPA claimed that Suitum's
action was not ripe for review because she had not yet attempted to sell
her development rights. 5 ' The Court focused only on the ripeness issue
and held that such a case would be ripe for review only when the
regulation had affected a plot of land and the landowner had received a
final decision. 2 At that point, the facts would present a justiciable
question of whether53 the regulation had gone "too far," and thus
constituted a taking.
Although the majority opinion ruled only on the narrow issue of
whether Suitum's claim was ripe for review, 5 4 Justice Scalia, in a
concurring opinion, chose to address how development rights fit in the
takings/just compensation equation. 55 Scalia suggested that development
rights should be considered only for determining just compensation.' 56
This was a departure from the Court's view in Penn Central in which it
suggested that development rights could be used to avoid a taking. 57 If
the value of development rights ensures that a regulation avoids going
"too far" because the land retains "substantial value," the landowner
receives substantially less than if the landowner had received just
compensation for the loss of the entire parcel of land. 58 By going beyond
the narrow issue presented to the Court, and persuading two other
justices to join his concurrence, Scalia indicated one possible direction of
the Court if the Court again faces the issue of development rights.'59
148. See id. at 729.
149. See id. at 730.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Seeid. at 731.
Seeid. at 732.
See id. at 737.
Id. at 744.

154. See id.

155. See id. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156. See id. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
158. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 748 (Scalia, J., concurring).
159. See R.S. Radford, TDRs and Takings: The Unanswered Question in Suitum v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 441,448-49 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course Study Material SC43, 1998).

Transferable Development Rights
Following the logic of Scalia's opinion, the Court would likely scrutinize
the next TDR scheme to ensure that the development rights provide the
necessary level of compensation required by the Fifth Amendment to
avoid an unconstitutional taking.
3.

Seattle's Vulnerability Under TraditionalChallenges

Because Seattle did not establish its current TDR system until 1988,
it was aware of the pitfalls of past programs and took steps to avoid
them. Unlike the programs challenged in FredF. French, Penn Central,
and Suitum, Seattle's TDR system does not force landowners to restrict
development on their land, but rather uses monetary incentive to
persuade them to do so. By making participation in the program
voluntary, Seattle's TDR system has avoided the takings and due process
challenges that plagued earlier systems. If landowners do not want to
limit the development of their land, they are not forced to do so."6 A
landowner who chooses to sell his or her development rights could not
claim a taking because an unconstitutional taking is predicated on the
government taking land without the owner's consent."' Because
transactions through Seattle's TDR system cannot be challenged as
takings, the issue raised by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Suitum
of whether development rights are just compensation will never arise. 62
Considering the difficulties faced by past TDR systems, Seattle has
successfully fashioned a TDR system that is constitutionally sound in
terms of restricting development.
B.

Subversion of ZoningLimits

1.

Substantive Due Process

By allowing developers to purchase rights to build larger buildings,
TDR systems thwart the well-ordered plan of zoning and are vulnerable
to due process challenges. Many see zoning as "the conflict between the
police power on the one side and the integrity of the right of private

160. See TDR Bank Report, supra note 6. Costonis envisioned a mandatory program for landmark
preservation and if the landowner did not want the rights, the city would acquire the property
through condemnation, using the funds from the bank to purchase the property. See Costonis, supra
note 8, at 52.
161. See Cunningham, supra note. 14, at 506.
162. See supranote 156 and accompanying text
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property on the other."163 The U.S. Supreme Court established the
constitutionality of zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 6
and in doing so, saw fit to defer to local planning commissions' views
and opinions in establishing zoning ordinances.6 6 Absent zoning laws
that are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare," zoning
plans would stand as constitutional."6 However, Euclid did not grant
unchecked zoning power to municipalities. 67 Rather, the Court held that
in terms of due process, the Constitution limits the government's police
6
power to a standard of reasonableness. 1
Once a government establishes a zoning plan, it must adhere to it or
expose itself to a due process challenge. 69 Developers purchase
development rights to exceed the FAR set by zoning. If the original
zoning is overly restrictive, the zoning should be adjusted upward
without forcing landowners to purchase development rights. 70 If the
original zoning is the correct standard to ensure the health and safety of
the community, then the increased development harms citizens and
surrounding landowners.'
Proponents of TDR systems such as Costonis suggest that transferring
development rights does not intensify development but simply
redistributes it. 72 Critics of TDR systems, however, suggest that the limit
on the total density is ineffective without a geographical connection, or
nexus, between the sending site and the receiving site. 73 Otherwise, if
the majority of the receiving sites are in a concentrated area away from
the sending sites, that area will become more dense than others. If
163. V.N. Brooks, The Offlce File Box-Emanationsfrom the Battlefield, in Zoning and the
American Dream, supra note 42, at 3, 5-6 (quoting July 1926 letter from Newton M. Baker to Frank
Hunter).
164. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For a colorful history and description of the people involved in Euclid,
see Brooks, supra note 163, and William M. Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and
Cronies: The Playersin Euclid v. Ambler, in Zoningand the American Dream, supra note 42, at 31.
165. See Euclid,272 U.S. at 394.
166. Id. at 395.

167. See Brooks, supranote 163, at 22.
168. See id.
169. See Strugar, supra note 22, at 642-44.

170. See id at 646.
171. See id.at 650.
172. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
173. See Marcus, supranote 27, at 42.
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landowners can transfer development rights only to adjacent lots, as with
the New York plan, then air and light will reach the street over the lower
building even if the shadow of the higher building blocks much of the
street. But if the sending and receiving sites are not near each other, the

goal of ensuring that air and light reach the street may be compromised
in the area of the receiving sites. 74 When bulk moves between sites that
have no geographical nexus, it subverts the goals of a zoning system.'
2.

Seattle's Vulnerability to a Substantive Due Process Challenge

Seattle's TDR system is vulnerable under two different types of due
process challenges. 76 First, developers may accuse Seattle of a misuse of
police power because the zoning limits are set artificially low.' 77 Second,
a diverse pool of potential litigants could argue that if the zoning limits
are currently correct, then the denser buildings allowed through the
purchase of development rights would by definition affect the health and
safety of the citizens. 7
The CAP sets zoning limits in downtown Seattle. 179 City officials did

not set the CAP limit to create a market for development rights; citizens
concerned about light and air and the tenor of downtown Seattle passed
the initiative. If they incorrectly assessed the proper zoning limits and
Seattle could actually sustain a denser downtown, then developers should

not have to pay extra to develop to that density.8 An indication that the
174. One commentator suggests:

mhe tension between TDR and uniform district zoning reaches a breaking point when the
nexus of benefit and burden formed by the radius of transferability of development rights cannot
be stretched to connect the benefited parcels (surrounding the open space) to the burdened
parcels (stuck with unwanted extra bulk in their vicinity). Thus, the zoning principle of
uniformly treating similarly situated interests is violated by long-distance development rights
transfers. The appeal of predictability and collective security which zoning makes to a
community as a system of land use regulation is sacrificed to the exigency of preservation in
this case.
Id.
175. See Marcus,supra note 36, at 898.
176. See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
177. See Marcus,supra note 27, at 41.
178. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
180. The key argument against populist zoning initiatives is that they "destroyol the
comprehensive scheme" that zoning by land use professionals implies. David G. Andersen,
Comment, UrbanBlight Meets MunicipalManifest Destiny: Zoning at the Ballot Box, the Regional
Welfare, and TransferableDevelopmentRights, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 519, 520-21 (1991).
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CAP sets zoning too low is that almost any new developments, even
those well below forty stories, require a purchase of development rights
to build.' Properly set zoning protects the health, safety, and welfare of
citizens; it would be unreasonable to prevent construction altogether.
Developers who do not want to pay for extra density to preserve lowincome housing or historic landmark theaters would have standing to
bring suit. The TDR system rests upon the idea that funding for public
amenities will no longer come from the general tax base, but instead will
come from developers who need to purchase development rights for their
projects.' In his Penn Central dissent, Justice Rehnquist expressed his
displeasure with New York's landmark preservation scheme by arguing
along due process lines that the government should not force individuals
"to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole."' 83
Even though developers have standing to bring suit, they apparently
do not have the motivation to do so. So far, developers have preferred to
pay for the development rights rather than enter into a protracted legal
battle. The result of a successful suit would be the invalidation of the
TDR system altogether, which might deprive the developers of the
chance to buy development rights, and would compel them to build
below the CAP. Most developers would not risk the uncertainties of
litigation in such a fluid legal terrain with the possibility of afterwards
being confined to the CAP limitations.
Assuming arguendo that the CAP creates the correct levels of height
and density to protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, then the
larger, denser buildings made possible by development rights will harm
citizens' health and safety.'84 Seattle's TDR system is vulnerable to the
same criticisms leveled at Costonis's Chicago plan because it allows
development rights to be shifted between geographically unconnected
sites. ' 5 The Seattle plan limits transfers of development rights to within

181. See supranote 94 and accompanying text.
182. See Delaney, supra note 24, at 607.
183. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
184. Commentators have suggested that the rigid numbers of zoning codes incorrectly implies
there is only one zoning answer as opposed to a possible range. See Costonis, supra note 8, at 3031.
185. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
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the downtown core so some general geographical nexus exists,'8 6 but

there is no assurance that a series of dense buildings will not be built
close to each other, limiting air and light and creating a highly congested

area.' 87 This lack of a geographical connection between the sending site
and the receiving site undermines the argument that density transfer will
not affect the overall tenor of the downtown area and calls into question
the city's entire zoning plan. 8'
Citizens' groups and land use professionals, some of whom proposed
and voted for the CAP out of concern for the density of downtown

Seattle, do not want its limits manipulated.'89 If citizens' groups feel that
a certain development project exceeding the CAP will jeopardize their
health, safety, and welfare, then they would have standing to sue.
Citizens'. groups in other municipalities have stopped development they
perceived to be harmful to their health, safety, and welfare. For example,

in New York City, a nonprofit organization concerned with urban design
brought a successful suit to invalidate a proposed local development
made larger through the use of zoning bonuses. 9 ' Concerned citizens in
Seattle have already expressed nervousness about the transfer of
development rights into Seattle's downtown core..'91 Innovative zoning

and regulatory plans that modify baseline zoning rules by allowing
developers to build larger buildings than would otherwise be permitted

sometimes become "lightning rod[s] for general discontent with local
186. Seattle has also decided to stretch the geographic nexus. An agreement to trade development
rights between Seattle and King County does not even make a pretense at a geographical nexus. The
City and County have entered into an agreement that allows developers in a particular part of
downtown Seattle to pay $150,000 for every additional floor of apartments above the CAP. About
half the money so generated would go to rural landowners who would receive $20,000 for giving up
the right to develop each parcel. For example, a landowner who owns 285 acres and could build one
unit per five acres at current zoning would receive over $1,100,000 to keep his or her land pristine.
See Murakami, supra note 17.
187. See Jerold S. Kayden, Market-BasedRegulatory Approaches: A ComparativeDiscussion of
EnvironmentalandLand Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 565,57273 (1992).
188. In addition, people who work in a particularly congested area of downtown Seattle will be
disproportionately affected by the transfer of development rights and will have to bear a higher
burden than people who work in the rest of the city. See id.
189. See Murakami, supra note 17.
190. See Jerold S. Kayden, Zoningfor Dollars:New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the
Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 Wash. UJ. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 12 (1991)
(discussing Municipal Art Soc'y v. City of New York, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1987)).
191. Peter Steinbrueck, a Seattle City Councilman and a co-chairperson of the CAP initiative,
expressed concern that ignoring the CAP would begin the movement towards unchecked
development that caused the CAP to be passed in the first place. See Murakami, supra note 17.
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land use policies."' ' Not all land use professionals believe that TDR
systems are a good idea. Some suggest that development rights transfer is
the wrong way to preserve landmarks because the system can lead only
to higher residential and commercial densities. 93 In addition, regardless
of the justification in planning terms, increases in concentration can be
harmful to individuals who work in the denser area.' 94
Seattle's manipulation of downtown zoning limits does not necessarily
implicate a violation of due process. Proponents of TDR systems suggest
that zoning is not an exact science and that politics plays as large a role
as planning in zoning formulation. In short, there exists no single correct
level of zoning that when violated would be unconstitutional. 95 In
addition, courts have largely deferred to municipalities to zone as they
see fit. 196 However, two Supreme Court decisions'97 suggest that the
Court will no longer automatically defer to local land use departments
when assessing the constitutionality of regulations.' 98
C.

EssentialNexus

1.

The Nollan and Dolan Decisions

The U.S. Supreme Court has not seen fit to clarify the confusion over
when a regulation is a taking,' 9 but it has provided guidance in
determining when a regulation is a reasonable use of police power.20 0
Although couched in takings-analysis terms, two U.S. Supreme Court
cases, Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission,20 1 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,0 2 use substantive due process language to explain their results.0 3
192. Kayden, supra note 190, at 6.
193. See Richards, supra note 36, at 371.
194. See id.
at 372.
195. See Costonis, supra note 22, at 628-29.
196. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
197. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994).
198. See Jerold S. Kayden, Judges as Planners:Limited or General Partners?,in Zoning and the
American Dream supra note 42, at 223, 243.
199. See Damon C. Watson, Recent Developments, Dolan and the 'Rough Proportionality'
Standard: Taking Its Toll on Loretto 's Bright Line: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994),
18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 591, 592 n.10 (1995).
200. See Kayden, supra note 198, at 243.
201. 483 U.S. 825.
202. 512 U.S. 374.
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The decisions evidence a shift by the U.S. Supreme Court from the
traditional deference to zoning plans suggested in Euclid," to an inquiry
that instead "requires judges to scrutinize more carefully the
justifications offered by planners20 in support of land use regulations
abridging private property rights.
In Nollan, the Court held that for a land use regulation to impose a
condition on a property owner to alleviate a harm created by that owner,
there must be an essential nexus between the condition and the harm.2 °6
If no nexus exists, the restriction is not a legitimate land use regulation,
but rather "an out-and-out plan of extortion."0 7 To reach this conclusion,
the Court used the first prong of the regulatory takings analysis that
establishes a regulation as a taking if it does not "substantially advance
legitimate state interests."2 8 The Court separated this prong into two
inquiries: what is a legitimate state interest and "what type of connection
between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that
the former 'substantially advance' the latter."'
By requiring a
connection between the regulation and the harm, the Court retreated from
the deference previously afforded land use planners, suggesting a new
level of judicial scrutiny of land use regulations.210
Although Nollan was a regulatory takings case, the language and logic
of the Court can be applied to due process cases. 21 ' Because the condition
involved in the Nollan decision was a permanent, public easement, the
Court could have reasoned that regardless of the legitimate state interest,
if a government requires a permanent physical occupation, it is a
203. See Kayden, supranote 198, at 230.
204. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
205. Kayden, supranote 198, at 223.
206. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
207. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)). Justice Scalia
elucidates this point by suggesting that

[tihe evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the
prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When
that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade
shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100

to the state treasury.
Id.
208. a at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see also supra note
108 and accompanying text.
209. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
210. See Kayden, supra note 198, at 240.
211. Seeid.at233.
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taking.212 Instead the Court used the regulatory takings analysis. 2 13 By
choosing to use the regulatory takings analysis and examining the
regulatory scheme using language in accord with a due process
analysis,2 14 the Court implied a new level of scrutiny for regulations
vulnerable to due process challenges.2 5 Prior to Nollan, the
"substantially advancing legitimate state interests" prong had not been
used by the Supreme Court in their takings analysis.2 6 It is no
coincidence that the "substantially advancing legitimate state interests"
takings test sounds suspiciously like the "substantial relation to health,
safety, morals or general welfare" due process test found in Euclid.217
The language of the Court indicates an end to the previous deference
given to land use planners regardless of whether their programs are
challenged under the Fifth Amendment or substantive due process.
By not reaching a conclusion on the "essential nexus," the Nollan
decision left open the question of what degree of essential nexus between
the condition and the harm is necessary to avoid a regulatory taking.218 In
219
1994 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dolan v. City of Tigard
to better define the standard for judging the proper nexus. 22' The Court
held that the correct degree of essential nexus between condition and
harm is a "rough proportionality.""2 2 The Court explained that "[n]o
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development., 222 The standard of rough proportionality threatens to end
the deference traditionally shown to planning commissions and the
212. See id. at 230.
213. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 115 and accompanying text
215. See Kayden, supra note 198, at 237.
216. See Lawrence, supra note 108, at 239. In fact, if one traces the origin of this prong of the
regulatory takings analysis, it ultimately leads back to a due process case. The Court cites Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), a takings case, for the two-prong test. But Agins cites Nectow
v. Cambridge, 227 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), a due process case, as the source of the "substantially
advancing state interests" prong. See Kayden, supra note 198, at 233.
217. See Kayden, supranote 198, at 233; see also supra note 166 and accompanying text.
218. See Kristen P. Sosnosky, Dolan v. City of Tigard: A Sequel to Nollan's EssentialNexus Test
for Regulatory Takings, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1677, 1692 (1995).
219. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
220. See id. at 389.
221. Id. at391.
222. Id.
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presumption of constitutionality that accompanied it.' It forces the
municipality to prove quantitatively that a regulation is a proper use of
police power by showing that it is in proportion to the harm. 4
2.

Implication of Nollan/DolanforSeattle's TDR System

Developers who buy development rights possess one of the strongest
challenges to Seattle's TDR system. The Nollan decision held that a
government must show an essential nexus between the condition and the
harm prevented.' By allowing developers to build at a higher FAR if
they buy development rights, Seattle's TDR system creates a connection
between denser buildings and the loss of low-income housing and
historic landmark theaters. Seattle might be able to show the connection
between increased development and the loss of low-income housing and
landmark theaters, but the Dolan standard of rough proportionality will
require the courts to closely scrutinize the city's justification. 6
Seattle developers purchase development rights voluntarily and
therefore would not have a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. 2 7
However, the Nollan logic suggests that courts will now examine any
land use condition for the requisite essential nexus to the harm,
regardless of whether it is being challenged under a takings claim or a
due process claim. 8 TDR systems are thus vulnerable to due process
challenges because they impose a condition on developers that has a
tenuous connection to the harm of increased development.
.., Every TDR transaction in Seattle involves two potential landowners:
the owner whose land generates the development rights and the owner
who purchases the rights to use in his or her development. 2 9 The TDR
bank obscures the connection between these transactions by allowing a
time lag between when the development rights are sold to the bank and
when they are bought." ° Developers who want to build larger buildings
must pay for development rights. The money for the development rights
223. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 843 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
224. See Dolan,512 U.S. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. See supranote 207 and accompanying text.
226. See Dolan,512 U.S. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. See Cunningham, supra note 14, at 506. The power of eminent domain is the power to take
property without the owner's consent. See id.
228. See Kayden, supranote 198, at 233.
229. See 7DR Bank Report, supranote 6, at 1.

230. See d.at l.
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go to landowners who choose to restrict their land to a particular use,
such as low-income housing or rural preservation."l Thus, by explicitly
connecting the two related transactions (the sale and purchase of
development rights), the TDR system, in essence, requires developers to
fund low-income housing as a condition of building larger buildings.
However, the harm created by developers with their larger, denser
buildings is actually a more congested downtown with its attendant lack
of air and light. 2 Thus, the Nollan essential nexus is lacking because no
nexus exists between the condition (funding low-income housing) and
the harm (congested downtown). The TDR system's lack of nexus
indicates a misuse of police power, and the program could be struck
down as a violation of due process. 3
Even if Seattle could show a connection between the condition and the
harm, it would be hard pressed to meet the rough proportionality
standard of Dolan. The Dolan standard suggests that courts will not
permit the city to rely generally on the premise that increased office
space will create a need for more low-income housing. To reach the
essential nexus requirement, the city will have to show "some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."234 The
city will have difficulty showing that a specific larger building will
somehow cause a need for the precise amount of low-income housing
saved through the developer's purchase of development rights.
Therefore, the city will fall short of the high standard of essential nexus
and expose itself to a constitutional challenge.
In the end, the success of Seattle's TDR system might prove to be its
downfall. Because of its success, development rights go for a
premium." In 1999, low-income housing and landmark performing arts
centers have development rights available for transfer. However, due to
the high price for development rights, private landowners have proposed

231. See Murakami, supra note 17.
232. See, e.g., Lassar, supra note 19, at 87-105.
233. See supranotes 211-217 and accompanying text.
234. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). It is unclear whether the city would have
to show whether only the extra space achieved through the TDR is directly proportional or that the
entire building creates this need for more housing. The city would have a difficult time if it were
forced to show that 40 floors make no difference in terms of the housing situation, but that the 41st
floor does.
235. See Enlow, supra note 21.

Transferable Development Rights
different types of buildings that should be included as sending sites. 6 As
the types of sites that generate transferable development rights become
further removed from the harms of increased development, the city will
have increasing difficulty demonstrating the essential nexus between the
payment of development rights and the benefit.
I.

CONCLUSION

Seattle's innovative TDR system sidestepped many of the problems
that plagued earlier systems. Because landowners sell their development
rights voluntarily and the TDR bank guarantees a value for the rights, the
Seattle system will continue to avoid a takings challenge. However, as
with any TDR system, Seattle's program is vulnerable to a due process
challenge because it manipulates the existing zoning limits. By allowing
building beyond the existing zoning, the TDR system provides
developers with ammunition to challenge the current zoning as too
restrictive. If, on the other hand, the city can show that the current zoning
is at the appropriate level, then citizens who want to keep downtown
Seattle livable will argue that transferring development rights creates
density harmful to their health, safety, and welfare.
Since its inception, Seattle's TDR system has been successful in
saving low-income housing and landmark theaters without using public
funds. Its success has led developers to propose other types of sites that
can transfer development rights. The Supreme Court cases of Nollan and
Dolan give courts the constitutional means to scrutinize closely Seattle's
TDR scheme to ensure that an essential nexus exists between the public
amenities paid for by development rights and the harms created by
increased density. The popularity of Seattle's TDR system with groups
that have standing to sue has so far prevented any challenges. However,
as the connection between the increased density and the public amenity
paid for by developers becomes more tenuous, the constitutional
vulnerability of Seattle's TDR scheme will simply become more
pronounced.

236. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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